# Talsec Global Threat Report 2025

In September 2025, mobile app security firm Talsec released its Global Threat Report, a data-driven look at the state of mobile application security drawn from its freeRASP SDK. With telemetry from more than **365 million** devices running over **5,000 apps**, the report offers one of the most comprehensive snapshots available of how (and where) mobile applications are being attacked in the wild.

The headline finding is simple: while serious incidents are rare in percentage terms, they are significant at scale, and the attack surface looks very different from one region to the next.

<figure><img src="/files/IXjAdkU0g0mMPSurjJ4m" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

### A tiered view of the threat landscape

Talsec organizes mobile threats into three severity tiers:

* **Critical**\
  App Tampering, Debugging, and Hooking
* **Major**\
  Root/Jailbreak, Unofficial Store installs, and Simulator use
* **Warning**\
  Screenshotting/Screen Recording, System VPN, Developer Mode, and ADB enabled

Looking across the global map, North America stands out for critical-tier incidents, particularly tampering and hooking. South Asia dominates several "major" and "warning" indicators tied to sideloading and developer-mode usage. Europe leads in screen capture incidents and VPN adoption.

### App distribution risks: tampering and unofficial stores

**App tampering**, where an attacker modifies and re-signs an app after release, is highest in North America at 0.131% of devices, followed by Europe at 0.058%. That may sound tiny, but North America's rate is roughly 26× higher than Latin America's and reflects attackers concentrating effort where the payoff is greatest.

<figure><img src="/files/dd1LA50wKhyapxlG97vi" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Tampering incidents</p></figcaption></figure>

**Unofficial store** installs tell a different regional story. South Asia leads at 0.456%, more than twice the North American rate and nearly four times Europe's. This tracks with the prevalence of third-party marketplaces and cloning apps in those markets - channels that routinely skip Google and Apple's policy enforcement and sometimes host apps quietly modified with malware or stripped paywalls.

<figure><img src="/files/t4UEbIE2WZ6Qcwrp60HY" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Unofficial Store incidents</p></figcaption></figure>

### Runtime attacks: hooking, debugging, and screen capture

Runtime attacks target the live app rather than its static code — and they are where attacker sophistication shows.

**Hooking** (e.g., Frida-style instrumentation used to read memory, bypass checks, or disable certificate pinning) is highest in North America at 0.202%, reflecting a mature pentesting and security-research scene alongside active criminal exploitation. Latin America registers just 0.008%.

<figure><img src="/files/yZg4kKrNaDvzhMoFe0lm" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Hooking incidents</p></figcaption></figure>

**Debugging** incidents are led by Europe (0.055%) and South Asia (0.052%), with North America and MENA lowest at 0.009%. Talsec attributes Europe's higher rate to its active bug-bounty culture, and North America's lower rate partly to enterprise-managed devices that block debugging.

<figure><img src="/files/HgIKy8dPXHgwQF8Z3pXe" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Debugging incidents</p></figcaption></figure>

**Screenshotting** and screen recording is by far the most common "warning" incident. Europe tops the chart at 3.98%, closely followed by North America (3.78%) and MENA (3.51%). These regions face heavy pressure from banking-focused malware and fraud operations that rely on screen-capture streaming to exfiltrate credentials, balances, and one-time codes.

<figure><img src="/files/xk8JZKTRrKxbmVJmfwZJ" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Screenshoting / Screen Recording incidents</p></figcaption></figure>

### Device environment risks

Even when an app itself isn't attacked directly, a compromised device sets the stage.

**Rooted/jailbroken** devices are most common in North America (0.294%), which Talsec links to permissive norms and large modding communities. Latin America sits at just 0.023%, consistent with fraud in that region skewing toward social engineering rather than device compromise.

<figure><img src="/files/voTjzGr8NI8673B8FWZF" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Root / Jailbreak incidents</p></figcaption></figure>

**Simulators/emulators** are most prevalent in Asia Pacific (0.034%) and Europe (0.028%), driven largely by game emulation and click-farm automation.

<figure><img src="/files/JhrY8EPy1szjr9hu4KFV" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Simulator incidents</p></figcaption></figure>

**Developer Mode** enabled is dramatically skewed toward South Asia at 1.147% (about 382× the North American rate) reflecting broad sideloading culture. ADB enabled follows the same pattern, with South Asia at 0.802% versus North America's 0.004%.

<figure><img src="/files/VkA42ilRibyttGoc0WDA" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of devices with Developer Mode enabled</p></figcaption></figure>

**System VPN** adoption is highest in Europe (9.32%) and North America (4.96%), with Asia Pacific (3.89%) showing pockets of very high national use tied to censorship workarounds.

<figure><img src="/files/GY2MbYONUeNqhgpi429e" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of devices with System VPN enabled</p></figcaption></figure>

### Device specifics: OS versions, mobile services, and security posture

The report also surveys the devices themselves:

**iOS** is highly consolidated around version 18.x globally, with iOS 26 rapidly gaining share — reflecting Apple's centralized update model.

<figure><img src="/files/nxK7j0imJP9ohrNLNfgh" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of iOS versions</p></figcaption></figure>

**Android** is fragmented by region: North America runs the newest versions (strong 16.x and 15.x), while MENA and Asia Pacific still carry meaningful 10.x–12.x populations, increasing exploit exposure.

<figure><img src="/files/zO8EahffPnbK5TpkEiAD" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Android versions</p></figcaption></figure>

**Google Play Services** coverage is effectively universal (>99% in most regions), with Asia Pacific the sole outlier at 93.39% due to mainland China's blocks on Google. Correspondingly, Huawei Mobile Services is strongest in MENA (6.31%) and Asia Pacific (4.14%).

<figure><img src="/files/ihvWUfPJNTCABAlmo2KS" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of mobile services (Google Play)</p></figcaption></figure>

<figure><img src="/files/p5OtEWEzPh1qJQczpboA" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of mobile services (Huawei Mobile Services)</p></figcaption></figure>

**Hardware-backed keystores** are essentially universal, so the weak link isn't cryptographic hardware but user posture: screen locks and biometrics. Europe leads in biometric adoption; Asia Pacific trails the pack by roughly 10 points on both locks and biometrics.

<figure><img src="/files/Pz3QvM3fgnAh1eaTA1nF" alt="" width="563"><figcaption><p>Regional distribution of Hardware-backed Keystore</p></figcaption></figure>

### The takeaway: RASP is no longer optional

Conclusion is unsurprising, but the data makes the case cleanly: signature checks at install time verify only that an app is signed, not that it was signed by the legitimate developer. Once an app is running on a rooted device, under a hooking framework, or inside a repackaged binary from an unofficial store, the operating system's default protections have already been outflanked.

**Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP)** closes that gap by detecting in-memory manipulation, hooking tools, unauthorized repacks, and risky runtime conditions while the app is executing — and by generating the telemetry needed to focus defenses on whichever region or threat class is heating up. For regulated sectors like finance and healthcare, where a single compromise carries severe financial, privacy, and compliance consequences, Talsec argues in-app protection has crossed from "enhancement" to "business necessity."

***

{% hint style="info" %}
You can find report [**here**](https://www.talsec.app/talsec-global-threat-report-2025).
{% endhint %}

***

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